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Synology Says Ransomware Is Hitting NAS Boxes Still Missing a Late-2024 DSM Patch: Finding the Storage Appliances You Haven’t Updated

Three IT operators inspect a rack-mounted network storage appliance and a printed checklist in a data-center aisle.

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There’s a particular kind of bad news that shows up in a vendor press release and then in your ticket queue the same week: ransomware on the network-attached storage boxes that were supposed to be the backup of last resort. On Oct. 29, 2026, Synology said threat actors are encrypting data on devices still running outdated DiskStation Manager builds, using a vulnerability the company patched in December 2024. Customer reports and a separate technical writeup name the payload C3RB3R. The useful work this week isn’t arguing about ransomware brands. It’s finding every Synology box that still needs a Synology NAS ransomware DSM update, then deciding whether its management page should be reachable from the open internet at all.

I want the limits of the evidence on the table before the checklist. Synology confirmed the ransomware campaign and pointed to a late-2024 advisory. It has not named a CVE in the Oct. 29 statement, and it has not used the word C3RB3R. The C3RB3R label, the .L0CK3D extension and the read-me3.txt note are documented in Qihoo 360’s analysis. 360 also attributes a different pair of flaws than the advisory Synology linked. Treat those as separate reports from the same period, not proof of a single campaign or one settled root cause.

What Synology Actually Said

In its Oct. 29, 2026 notice, Synology wrote: “Synology has identified threat actors exploiting a vulnerability patched in December 2024 to target devices running outdated versions of DSM. These attacks aim to encrypt data and extort ransom.” The company “strongly urges” anyone on vulnerable versions to update immediately and to enable automatic updates. For details it points to Synology-SA-24:20.

That advisory was first published Nov. 5, 2024, after Pwn2Own. Its critical item is CVE-2024-10441, rated CVSS 9.8: an improper encoding or escaping of output flaw in the system plugin daemon that “allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code.” The same bulletin also covers CVE-2024-50629 and CVE-2024-10445. Fixed builds listed there include DSM 7.2.2-72806-1, 7.2.1-69057-6, 7.2-64570-4, 7.1.1-42962-7 and 6.2.4-25556-8, or later. Synology’s December 2024 language lines up with the DSM 6.2 fix date in that advisory’s revision history (Dec. 5, 2024). Important caveat: Synology has not confirmed which of those three CVEs, if any specific one, is the entry point in this campaign. “A vulnerability patched in December 2024” is as precise as the vendor got.

What 360 Reported, and Why It Matters

On Oct. 30, 2026, Qihoo 360’s anti-ransomware team published an analysis of samples from Synology NAS owners who asked for help during October. 360 identifies the payload as C3RB3R, a Cerber-family variant, and says encrypted files get a .L0CK3D extension (digit zero) with a read-me3.txt ransom note. 360 attributes the intrusion to CVE-2026-13639 and CVE-2026-13684, which Synology fixed on Sept. 18, 2026 in Synology-SA-26:13. Both of those are CVSS 9.8, unauthenticated, and described as letting remote attackers read or write arbitrary files and cause denial of service. Fixed builds on that advisory are DSM 7.4-90075, 7.3.2-86009-4, 7.2.2-72806-9 and 7.2.1-69057-12, or later.

Those are not the same bugs Synology linked on Oct. 29. I am not picking a winner. For an operator, the practical answer is the boring one: take the newest DSM build your model will accept, because a box patched only to the SA-24:20 floors can still sit below the SA-26:13 floors on the 7.2.1 and 7.2.2 branches.

Finding the Boxes That Need a Synology NAS Ransomware DSM Update

The following is my opinion, shaped by Synology’s own hardening guidance and by the version tables above.

  1. Inventory by model and DSM build, not by “it feels current.” Sign in locally, open Control Panel, Update & Restore, DSM Update, and write down the exact build string. Compare it to both advisory floors for that branch. “Latest” in Package Center is not a substitute for reading the build number.
  2. Prefer the newer floor when branches overlap. On DSM 7.2.2, SA-24:20 wants 72806-1 or later; SA-26:13 wants 72806-9 or later. Same story on 7.2.1 (69057-6 versus 69057-12). Aim at the higher number, then take whatever newer release Synology offers for that model.
  3. Turn on automatic DSM updates after you land on a patched build. That is Synology’s explicit recommendation in the Oct. 29 notice. Automatic updates do not undo a compromise that already happened.
  4. Pull DSM off the public internet. Synology’s ransomware prevention article says, plainly, “Do not expose DSM to the Internet unless necessary,” and recommends a VPN when remote access is required. Its broader hardening guide says that if you need to manage DSM remotely, “we recommend connecting via VPN instead of exposing DSM management ports directly to the internet.” Default HTTP and HTTPS ports are 5000 and 5001. In my view, any NAS whose login page answers on a public address is already overdue for a change window, ransomware or not.
  5. Check backups that live on the same chassis. Do not assume backups are safe just because they exist. Check whether local snapshots are protected and whether attached USB copies can be modified by the compromised system; verify an independent offline or off-site recovery copy. Synology also recommends immutable snapshots on supported models. Synology’s own ransomware guidance still points at offline, encrypted backups you can actually restore, following a 3-2-1 pattern, plus rehearsed recovery.

If You Already See .L0CK3D Files

Synology’s response checklist starts with isolation: identify affected systems and take them off the network. Preserve the ransom note and logs before you wipe anything. Rotating credentials from a clean machine, not from the suspect NAS, is the order of operations that keeps a second foothold from walking back in. Patching after encryption does not decrypt files. Paying is a separate decision I won’t pretend to settle here; my bias, as an operator, is rebuild from known-good media and restore from offline backups.

Hypothetical: say you run a dozen Synology units across a few sites, and only three of them still answer on public 5001. Those three are the first change window, even if their DSM builds look fine on paper. Exposure is the correlated failure. The CVE arguments matter for attribution reports. For getting through the week, the build string and the listening ports matter more.

Update the boxes. Stop advertising the management page. Then go prove the backups restore before the next vendor notice lands on a Saturday.

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