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CISA and FBI Say SafePay Ransomware Hit at Least 600 Victims and Wiped Some of Their Backups: Using Advisory AA26-293A to Test Your Own Recovery Before They Do

Two IT engineers check a backup storage rack in a data center aisle, one holding a tablet

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Most ransomware tabletop exercises end with someone saying, “And then we restore from backup.” The joint SafePay ransomware CISA advisory AA26-293A is a good reason to test that sentence. The agencies say SafePay actors go after recovery before they encrypt anything, and that in some cases they deleted every network-attached backup a victim had. If your recovery plan assumes the backups will be there, this advisory is a free test script.

What Advisory AA26-293A Says

The advisory, #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware, carries the product ID AA26-293A and an original publication date of October 20, 2026. It is a joint advisory. The authoring agencies are the FBI, CISA, and the U.S. Secret Service, plus Germany’s Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz, the UK’s National Crime Agency, and the UK’s North West Regional Organised Crime Unit. It says its TTPs and indicators come from “FBI, USSS, and Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz investigations as recently as August 2026.”

On scale, the advisory says SafePay “was among the most active ransomware groups in 2026” and that its actors “have impacted at least 600 separate victims from multiple critical infrastructure sectors” since August 2024. CISA’s press release of October 21 rounds that to “approximately 600 victims,” and it quotes the FBI’s Brett Leatherman saying the actors “have already targeted more than 600 victims worldwide.” The advisory’s own wording is “at least 600” victims “impacted.” I am using that, not “organizations destroyed.”

What It Says About Backups

This is the part that matters most, and the advisory is more specific than “destroyed their backups.” It describes three distinct behaviors, all mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1490, Inhibit System Recovery:

  • Shadow copies: SafePay actors “halt the Volume Shadow Copy Service.”
  • NAS backups: they “reset Network Attached Storage containing victim backup data to initial factory settings to inhibit system recovery attempts.”
  • Deletion, sometimes: the ATT&CK table adds that “In some cases, SafePay threat actors deleted all network-attached backups of company data.”

The press release summarizes it as undermining recovery “by deleting or disabling backups.” So the accurate version is this. The advisory describes disabling shadow copies, factory-resetting backup NAS devices, and, in some cases, deleting all network-attached backups. It does not say every victim lost every backup, and it does not describe the backups themselves being encrypted. Encryption is reserved for files, which the advisory says are locked with a ChaCha20 and RSA hybrid scheme and “cannot be recovered without the decryption key.”

How They Get There

The advisory’s path to the backups is worth knowing, because each step is a place to catch them:

  • Initial access: credential exposure, brute-force password attacks, phished accounts, and VPN access, including through Mullvad VPN IP addresses. They exploit five listed CVEs in edge devices and internet-exposed systems: CVE-2020-3259, CVE-2023-20269, CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711, and CVE-2024-40766. Some of these they exploit “through automated scripts.”
  • Persistence and evasion: they take admin rights on existing or new accounts, disable security software, and in some cases change user passwords so valid logins stop working.
  • Lateral movement: PsExec, WinRM, RDP, and remote management tools. They find shares with ShareFinder.ps1 and SharpShares.exe.
  • Exfiltration before encryption: 7-Zip, WinRAR, and FileZilla to collect, WinSCP and RClone to send, and sometimes OneDrive. Victims who don’t pay face leak-site posting and, the advisory says, phone calls from the group.

My Recommendations: Test Your Recovery Against This Advisory

This section is my own recommendation. It is built on the advisory’s TTPs and mitigations, but the test plan is mine, not CISA’s.

  1. Ask whether your admin account can wipe your backups. The advisory’s mitigations call for backups that are “encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted).” Log in as a domain admin and see whether you can delete a backup set or factory-reset the backup NAS. If you can, so can someone who steals that account.
  2. Check that an offline copy really exists. The advisory says to “Maintain offline backups of data and regularly test and maintain backup and restoration processes.” Find the copy that a NAS factory reset can’t reach. Then prove it is current.
  3. Run a restore without shadow copies. Assume Volume Shadow Copy is gone and restore a real server from your other backups. Time it. That number is your actual recovery time, not the one in the policy document.
  4. Patch the five CVEs, then check whether you were already hit. CISA’s press release urges “urgently patching the known exploited vulnerabilities in this advisory and conducting forensic triage to determine if systems have been compromised.” If any of these products face the internet in your environment, patching alone is not enough.
  5. Separate backup credentials from the domain. The advisory recommends least privilege and just-in-time admin access. I would go further and keep the backup system’s admin accounts out of Active Directory entirely.
  6. Alert on the precursors. Stopping the shadow copy service, mass admin password changes, new admin accounts, and RClone or WinSCP traffic to unfamiliar destinations should all page someone. The advisory’s mitigations include reviewing systems for “new, unactive and/or unrecognized accounts.”
  7. Practice the locked-out scenario. If attackers change your admins’ passwords, how do you get back in? Write the break-glass procedure and test it.

Here is a hypothetical. Your backup appliance sits on the same domain as everything else, and its admin is a domain group. An attacker who reaches domain admin resets the appliance to factory settings at 2 a.m. and starts encryption at 3. Your restore plan now depends on whatever tape or cloud copy exists outside that domain. That is my illustration of the advisory’s described TTPs, not a reported case.

The Bottom Line

The advisory is specific: at least 600 victims, recovery targeted before encryption, shadow copies disabled, backup NAS devices reset, and in some cases all network-attached backups deleted. Read it as a test plan. Run the steps above against your own environment before someone else runs them for you.

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