The outage that grounded airlines is now a policy argument between a platform owner and regulators. Whoever wins shapes how deep your EDR agent gets to reach, and your rollback plan should not wait for the verdict. Much of the debate over Microsoft, EU kernel access, and the CrowdStrike outage still traces back to a July 2024 Microsoft claim, not a fresh 2026 statement. What is new is a UK Competition and Markets Authority review that puts Windows and Microsoft security in the same regulatory frame.
Microsoft’s EU Kernel Access Argument Dates to 2024, Not This Year
After the July 19, 2024 CrowdStrike Falcon update disrupted Windows systems worldwide, Microsoft pointed reporters to a 2009 European Commission interoperability undertaking. As contemporaneous coverage summarized it, a Microsoft spokesperson said the undertaking “gives makers of security software the same level of access to Windows that Microsoft gets,” and contrasted that with Apple’s more closed model. The European Commission pushed back. A Commission spokesperson told Euronews that Microsoft is free to adapt its security infrastructure within EU competition law, that the incident was not limited to the EU, and that Microsoft had not raised security concerns about the 2009 agreement with the Commission before or after the outage.
I could not find a 2026 primary Microsoft statement repeating that EU-rules-made-the-outage-possible line. Treat it as Microsoft’s 2024 claim, still cited in policy debates, not as news Microsoft just made.
What the UK CMA Is Actually Examining
The current UK regulator is the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), not a separate cybersecurity agency. On May 14, 2026 it opened a strategic market status (SMS) investigation into Microsoft’s business software ecosystem. On October 16, 2026 it published a proposed decision to designate Microsoft with SMS for that ecosystem and opened consultation (closing 5pm on November 13, 2026), with a statutory final-decision deadline of February 2027.
The provisional scope groups five digital activities, including a PC operating system activity (Windows) and a Security Software activity. The Security Software description covers software that secures operating systems, applications, and data through authentication, endpoint management, and threat detection and prevention. The CMA provisionally puts Entra, Active Directory, Intune, and Defender in that bucket, with some Purview, Security Copilot, and Agent 365 functions also in scope. Its press release says the indicative roadmap includes “Examining whether the way Microsoft bundles and integrates its security products limits customer choice.” That is about competition and choice in a stack that includes both Windows and Microsoft security. It is not a dedicated CrowdStrike-outage or kernel-access case. SMS designation, the CMA notes, does not assume wrongdoing.
Where Kernel Access Stands Now
Separately, Microsoft has been redesigning how third-party security runs on Windows. In its June 26, 2025 Windows Resiliency Initiative update, David Weston wrote that a private preview of the Windows endpoint security platform would let Microsoft Virus Initiative partners “start building their solutions to run outside the Windows kernel,” so antivirus and endpoint protection “can run in user mode just as apps do.” Microsoft’s WRI product page still lists the Windows Endpoint Security Platform (WESP) as enabling protection solutions “to run outside the kernel,” alongside MVI 3.0 safe-deployment requirements such as gradual rings.
That does not mean kernel-mode agents are gone. An October 26, 2026 technical analysis by Pavel Yosifovich for Elastic Security Labs found WESP components (wesp.sys and espclient.dll) already present in Windows Insider builds, described the project as early, and noted that the preview client API appeared to lack a clear path for user-mode code to veto process creation the way classic kernel callbacks can. In other words: the migration is underway in engineering previews, not finished as a fleet-wide customer mandate. Keep “made the outage possible” attributed to Microsoft’s 2024 claim about the access model, not as a regulator’s finding.
My Recommendations for Endpoint Buyers
These are my opinions for IT and security leaders, not legal advice and not CMA or Microsoft guidance.
- Ask every EDR vendor where their critical path still lives. Kernel driver, WESP user-mode path, or hybrid. Get a dated roadmap for staged updates and crash recovery.
- Require safe deployment practices in the contract. Rings, kill switches, and a proven rollback that does not depend on the agent booting cleanly.
- Separate platform concentration from best-of-breed detection. The CMA’s provisional framing is that Windows and Microsoft security reinforce each other. Even if you standardize on Defender, keep an independent telemetry path and an offline recovery plan for boot failures.
- Tabletop a kernel-level agent failure. Not just malware. Assume a bad content update and time how long until machines are productive again.
Picture this hypothetical. Your primary EDR still ships a kernel driver while a WESP path is “coming.” A content update fails on Friday night. If your runbook only covers malware quarantine, you are replaying 2024. That scenario is my illustration, not a new incident.
The Bottom Line
Microsoft’s EU-undertaking explanation for third-party kernel reach is a 2024 claim the Commission disputed. The live story in late 2026 is the UK CMA’s proposed SMS designation covering both Windows and Microsoft security, plus a still-early push to move endpoint agents out of the kernel. Build your stack for staged rollouts and boot-time recovery now. Do not wait for the consultation to close.









