Steve Miller's Blog

A digital workshop for systems-minded tech commentary.

Category: Security

  • Microsoft’s 2024 Claim That EU Rules Made the CrowdStrike Outage Possible Still Frames the Kernel Fight: What the UK CMA Probe Means for Your Endpoint Stack

    Microsoft’s 2024 Claim That EU Rules Made the CrowdStrike Outage Possible Still Frames the Kernel Fight: What the UK CMA Probe Means for Your Endpoint Stack

    The outage that grounded airlines is now a policy argument between a platform owner and regulators. Whoever wins shapes how deep your EDR agent gets to reach, and your rollback plan should not wait for the verdict. Much of the debate over Microsoft, EU kernel access, and the CrowdStrike outage still traces back to a July 2024 Microsoft claim, not a fresh 2026 statement. What is new is a UK Competition and Markets Authority review that puts Windows and Microsoft security in the same regulatory frame.

    Microsoft’s EU Kernel Access Argument Dates to 2024, Not This Year

    After the July 19, 2024 CrowdStrike Falcon update disrupted Windows systems worldwide, Microsoft pointed reporters to a 2009 European Commission interoperability undertaking. As contemporaneous coverage summarized it, a Microsoft spokesperson said the undertaking “gives makers of security software the same level of access to Windows that Microsoft gets,” and contrasted that with Apple’s more closed model. The European Commission pushed back. A Commission spokesperson told Euronews that Microsoft is free to adapt its security infrastructure within EU competition law, that the incident was not limited to the EU, and that Microsoft had not raised security concerns about the 2009 agreement with the Commission before or after the outage.

    I could not find a 2026 primary Microsoft statement repeating that EU-rules-made-the-outage-possible line. Treat it as Microsoft’s 2024 claim, still cited in policy debates, not as news Microsoft just made.

    What the UK CMA Is Actually Examining

    The current UK regulator is the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), not a separate cybersecurity agency. On May 14, 2026 it opened a strategic market status (SMS) investigation into Microsoft’s business software ecosystem. On October 16, 2026 it published a proposed decision to designate Microsoft with SMS for that ecosystem and opened consultation (closing 5pm on November 13, 2026), with a statutory final-decision deadline of February 2027.

    The provisional scope groups five digital activities, including a PC operating system activity (Windows) and a Security Software activity. The Security Software description covers software that secures operating systems, applications, and data through authentication, endpoint management, and threat detection and prevention. The CMA provisionally puts Entra, Active Directory, Intune, and Defender in that bucket, with some Purview, Security Copilot, and Agent 365 functions also in scope. Its press release says the indicative roadmap includes “Examining whether the way Microsoft bundles and integrates its security products limits customer choice.” That is about competition and choice in a stack that includes both Windows and Microsoft security. It is not a dedicated CrowdStrike-outage or kernel-access case. SMS designation, the CMA notes, does not assume wrongdoing.

    Where Kernel Access Stands Now

    Separately, Microsoft has been redesigning how third-party security runs on Windows. In its June 26, 2025 Windows Resiliency Initiative update, David Weston wrote that a private preview of the Windows endpoint security platform would let Microsoft Virus Initiative partners “start building their solutions to run outside the Windows kernel,” so antivirus and endpoint protection “can run in user mode just as apps do.” Microsoft’s WRI product page still lists the Windows Endpoint Security Platform (WESP) as enabling protection solutions “to run outside the kernel,” alongside MVI 3.0 safe-deployment requirements such as gradual rings.

    That does not mean kernel-mode agents are gone. An October 26, 2026 technical analysis by Pavel Yosifovich for Elastic Security Labs found WESP components (wesp.sys and espclient.dll) already present in Windows Insider builds, described the project as early, and noted that the preview client API appeared to lack a clear path for user-mode code to veto process creation the way classic kernel callbacks can. In other words: the migration is underway in engineering previews, not finished as a fleet-wide customer mandate. Keep “made the outage possible” attributed to Microsoft’s 2024 claim about the access model, not as a regulator’s finding.

    My Recommendations for Endpoint Buyers

    These are my opinions for IT and security leaders, not legal advice and not CMA or Microsoft guidance.

    • Ask every EDR vendor where their critical path still lives. Kernel driver, WESP user-mode path, or hybrid. Get a dated roadmap for staged updates and crash recovery.
    • Require safe deployment practices in the contract. Rings, kill switches, and a proven rollback that does not depend on the agent booting cleanly.
    • Separate platform concentration from best-of-breed detection. The CMA’s provisional framing is that Windows and Microsoft security reinforce each other. Even if you standardize on Defender, keep an independent telemetry path and an offline recovery plan for boot failures.
    • Tabletop a kernel-level agent failure. Not just malware. Assume a bad content update and time how long until machines are productive again.

    Picture this hypothetical. Your primary EDR still ships a kernel driver while a WESP path is “coming.” A content update fails on Friday night. If your runbook only covers malware quarantine, you are replaying 2024. That scenario is my illustration, not a new incident.

    The Bottom Line

    Microsoft’s EU-undertaking explanation for third-party kernel reach is a 2024 claim the Commission disputed. The live story in late 2026 is the UK CMA’s proposed SMS designation covering both Windows and Microsoft security, plus a still-early push to move endpoint agents out of the kernel. Build your stack for staged rollouts and boot-time recovery now. Do not wait for the consultation to close.

  • A Researcher Published 11 Tailscale SSH Flaws, Now Fixed in v1.104.4: How to Contain Your Mesh VPN When One Device Gets Popped

    A Researcher Published 11 Tailscale SSH Flaws, Now Fixed in v1.104.4: How to Contain Your Mesh VPN When One Device Gets Popped

    Mesh VPNs sold us on “every device is its own perimeter.” That only holds if one bad laptop cannot walk straight to root on the database box. This week’s Tailscale SSH vulnerability root access disclosure says the ACL you trusted may not be the wall you thought it was, at least for Tailscale SSH with forwarding enabled.

    What the Researcher Published

    On October 24–25, 2026, Erica Windisch of Cyberdione Labs published Tailworm, a lab security assessment of Tailscale client v1.104.2 and self-hosted headscale v0.29.5. The report lists 11 findings across Tailscale SSH, experimental conn25 app connectors, serve/funnel, the DERP client, and headscale. All were “verified by reproduction in a lab environment on unmodified, released software,” the report says. It describes lab tests, not attacks seen on customer networks.

    The headline class is Tailscale SSH unix-socket forwarding (findings 1–3). Per the report, forwarding path checks and file operations run as root inside tailscaled. With one approved device and an SSH policy rule that permits forwarding, an ordinary session can dial or replace privileged sockets such as Docker or systemd. Windisch reports lab results of root execution on targets, capture of enrollment keys, and, on a Tailnet-Lock-disabled lab setup, joining a rogue node. The report’s own words: restricting SSH to non-privileged accounts is “defense-in-depth only” and “does not mitigate these findings.” Check mode, it says, gates session start only and does not constrain forwarding once a session is open.

    Other findings cover experimental app connectors choosing destinations outside ACL visibility, a serve TCP forward to the local admin API, memory exhaustion in SSH sessions and relays, and headscale onboarding lockout. Those are researcher claims with lab evidence; treat them as Cyberdione Labs data until Tailscale publishes its own per-finding advisory.

    Patch Status: Fixed in Tailscale v1.104.4

    Update, November 3, 2026: Tailscale has shipped a fixed client. Tailscale v1.104.4, released October 28, 2026, makes Tailscale SSH perform Unix socket forwarding as the authenticated user rather than as root, which blocks peers from reaching root-only sockets such as the Docker socket or the tailscaled local API. The same release bounds SSH session memory and tightens serve Unix backends. Tailscale published these as security bulletins TS-2026-014 (SSH Unix socket forwarding to root-only sockets), TS-2026-015 (SSH session memory exhaustion), TS-2026-016 (serve Unix backends reaching privileged sockets), and TS-2026-017 (HTTP/2 serve capability mix-up), each fixed in “1.104.4 or newer.” v1.104.3 was internal-only, and the current client is v1.104.5 (November 2). If you use Tailscale SSH or Serve, upgrade to v1.104.4 or newer now.

    For the record, this post was first drafted on October 27, when the newest public client was still v1.104.2, the version the researcher tested. On October 26, Tailscale published Tailscale SSH: Investigation and remediation update, calling the privilege-escalation issues “serious security issues” and targeting a release by the end of October 27. The fixed build landed a day later.

    On notice timing: The Hacker News reports Windisch saying she sent the report and proof-of-concept to Tailscale’s security contact on the Saturday before the public post, and she described the process on Hacker News as “reported but not coordinated.” The Tailworm write-up itself argues for “rapid awareness” to speed remediation. Treat notice timing as disputed enough that “without warning” overstates it.

    What Tailscale Confirms Versus What Remains Researcher-Only

    Tailscale confirms a serious privilege-escalation class for authorized SSH sessions and says exploitation “depends on the permissions granted to the connecting user or device, the system’s configuration, and other conditions.” It is “not recommending that everyone disable Tailscale SSH.” Its bulletins cover the SSH forwarding, SSH memory, and serve findings with a fixed version, but it has not published a finding-by-finding confirmation of all 11 Tailworm items. Separately, do not confuse this week with earlier 2026 bulletins TS-2026-006 and TS-2026-009, which fixed different Tailscale SSH tricks that could reach root despite autogroup:nonroot and were patched in v1.98.9. Tailworm’s core claim is a different class: forwarding that runs with daemon privilege from an already-allowed unprivileged session.

    My Recommendations: Contain the Mesh Now

    The steps below mix Tailscale’s published interim advice with my own operator opinion. This is not a substitute for Tailscale Support.

    1. Disable SSH forwarding where you do not need it. Tailscale’s update says to set TS_SSH_DISABLE_FORWARDING=1 in the tailscaled environment and restart. That mitigates several of the more serious findings without turning SSH off. On SaaS, also deny forwarding per SSH rule. On headscale 0.29.5, the researcher says forwarding cannot be disabled per rule, so treat every SSH grant as high risk until you can upgrade.
    2. Rewrite SSH rules as per-pair grants. Specific source device to specific destination. Drop identity-wide and tag-wide accept rules. The report calls per-pair grants the control that stopped lab spread.
    3. Audit serve and app connectors. Remove serve TCP forwards to unix sockets, especially anything aimed at tailscaled.sock. Pull connector entitlements from devices that do not need them.
    4. Upgrade to v1.104.4 or newer and plan containment. Update every node and turn on auto-updates where you can. If a device is compromised, delete it at the control plane. Reimaging alone does not revoke keys an attacker may have copied off the host. That last point is the researcher’s claim; Tailscale’s update does not repeat it, but it is sound incident practice in my view.

    Picture this hypothetical. A developer laptop is phished. That laptop already has a Tailscale SSH rule to your CI hosts with forwarding left on. Under the researcher’s model, that foothold is the whole prerequisite. Tighten the rule and kill forwarding before you need the hypothetical to become a ticket. That scenario is my illustration, not a reported breach.

    The Bottom Line

    Eleven lab-verified findings are public. Tailscale agrees the SSH privilege-escalation class is serious and shipped fixes in v1.104.4 on October 28, 2026. Until every node runs v1.104.4 or newer, assume Tailscale SSH with forwarding is a lateral-movement path from any device your policy already trusts, and shrink that trust now.

  • SEC Exam Priorities Put AI and Super-Intelligence Risk on This Year’s List: The Governance Paper Trail IT Should Start Building Now

    SEC Exam Priorities Put AI and Super-Intelligence Risk on This Year’s List: The Governance Paper Trail IT Should Start Building Now

    Most companies can describe their AI strategy in a slide. An examiner will ask for the inventory, the approval record, and proof the marketing claims match what the tools actually do. That evidence lives in IT systems, not in the pitch deck. If you are searching for SEC exam priorities AI risk governance, the place to start is the Division of Examinations’ current fiscal-year document, not a deck title.

    What the Priorities Documents Actually Say

    Today is late October 2026. The SEC’s fiscal year runs from October through September, so Fiscal Year 2027 is the current year. On October 23, 2026, the Commission announced the Division of Examinations’ Examination Priorities for Fiscal Year 2027. That is this year’s exam list, not next year’s. The working headline’s “Next Year” wording was wrong for that reason, so I retitled the post.

    The FY2027 PDF does not lean on the phrase “artificial intelligence” the way prior years did. It uses “super intelligence (SI).” The leadership message says registrants are “increasingly incorporating super intelligence (SI) into their businesses,” including “generative SI tools to support research, drafting, coding, and client communications, as well as advisory and portfolio management functions, and compliance monitoring and surveillance.” Under “Emerging Financial Technology,” the Division says it will prioritize examinations of “policies and procedures relating to monitoring SI, including its use in fraud prevention and detection, back-office operations, compliance with AML and Reg BI obligations, and trading functions.” It also flags SI-related cyber threats such as “SI-generated phishing messaging and synthetic or deepfake voice and video.”

    The same section keeps the automated-tools checklist firms already know from prior years. Reviews of automated investment advisory services and related tools will generally ask whether: “(1) representations are fair and accurate; (2) operations and controls are consistent with disclosures made to investors; and (3) algorithms lead to advice or recommendations consistent with investors’ investment profiles or stated strategies.”

    That continuity matters. The Division’s Examination Priorities for Fiscal Year 2026, released November 17, 2025, used “AI” explicitly. It said the Division would “review for accuracy registrant representations regarding their AI capabilities or AI” and assess “adequate policies and procedures to monitor and/or supervise their use of AI technologies,” including fraud prevention, back-office, AML, and trading. FY2026 cybersecurity language also called out “new risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI) and polymorphic malware.” So AI-related exam focus is not brand new. FY2027 reframes and intensifies it as SI while keeping the automated-tools and representation tests.

    When Marketing Claims Did Not Match Reality

    The representation test has teeth. On March 18, 2024, the SEC announced settled charges against Delphia (USA) Inc. and Global Predictions Inc. for what Chair Gensler called “AI washing,” false and misleading statements about purported AI use. Per the SEC press release, Delphia claimed it used AI and machine learning with client data when it did not have those capabilities, and Global Predictions falsely claimed to be the “first regulated AI financial advisor” and to offer “expert AI-driven forecasts.” The firms paid $225,000 and $175,000 in civil penalties, respectively. The Division of Examinations assisted the investigations. That case is enforcement, not an exam-priorities checklist, but it shows why “representations are fair and accurate” is not a soft ask.

    My Recommendations: Build the Paper Trail Now

    Everything below is my opinion for IT and compliance teams at registered firms and the vendors that serve them. The priorities PDFs do not publish a fixed document request list, and an AI inventory is not a named statutory form.

    1. Inventory every AI or SI tool that touches advice, trading, marketing, AML, surveillance, or customer data. Record the vendor, model or product name, business owner, data classes ingested, and whether outputs can reach clients or filings. Shadow SaaS counts.
    2. Map claims to capability. Pull website copy, Form ADV language, pitch decks, and sales emails that mention AI or SI. Line each claim up against what the tool actually does today. If you cannot demonstrate the capability, change the claim before an examiner asks.
    3. Write and implement monitoring procedures. FY2026 and FY2027 both ask whether firms have policies to monitor or supervise AI/SI use in fraud detection, back-office, AML, Reg BI, and trading. Document who reviews outputs, how often, and what happens when a model drifts or a vendor changes a feature.
    4. Keep testing and change records. For advisory or recommendation algorithms, retain evidence that outputs stay consistent with stated strategies and investor profiles after model updates. That is how you answer the priorities’ algorithm-consistency questions without scrambling.
    5. Treat deepfake and SI phishing as exam-relevant cyber risk. FY2027 expressly ties SI to social-engineering threats. Update training, call-back verification, and incident playbooks, and keep the dated materials.

    Picture this hypothetical. An examiner’s document request asks for a list of AI tools used in marketing and the supporting policies. Your deck says the firm uses “proprietary AI research.” Your inventory shows a generic chatbot drafting blog posts. Closing that gap now is cheaper than explaining it under oath later. That scenario is my illustration, not a published SEC request letter.

    The Bottom Line

    The Division of Examinations’ FY2027 priorities, announced October 23, 2026, put super intelligence, automated investment tools, and the accuracy of technology claims on this year’s exam list. FY2026 had already named AI. In my view, the firms that will look prepared are the ones that can produce an inventory, the approval trail, and proof that public claims match the tools in production.

  • 79% of Third-Party Breach Victims in Kroll Cases Were Hit Through Technology Firms: Rebuilding Vendor Risk Reviews Around Who Actually Holds Your Data

    79% of Third-Party Breach Victims in Kroll Cases Were Hit Through Technology Firms: Rebuilding Vendor Risk Reviews Around Who Actually Holds Your Data

    The annual vendor questionnaire asks whether a supplier has a security policy. The third-party data breach vendor risk management problem landing this year asks a different question: how many of your customers’ records sit in a SaaS tool someone signed up for with a corporate card. New case data from Kroll makes that gap hard to ignore.

    What Kroll Actually Measured

    On October 22, 2026, Kroll published its Data Breach Outlook 2026: The Third-Party Domino Effect. The firm analyzed data breach incidents handled by its Cyber and Data Resilience practice between June 2025 and June 2026, and ran a companion survey of 250 risk and compliance leaders, C-suite executives, and board members. These are Kroll’s own cases and survey respondents, not a census of every breach worldwide. Treat the figures as vendor data from that caseload.

    Two numbers drive the headline. First, 69% of affected individuals in those incidents “were breached due to a third-party breach,” as Kroll’s publication page puts it. Second, of that third-party group, 79% “were from the technology sector,” compared with finance (9%), insurance (6%), and healthcare (5%). Kroll’s press release says the same thing another way: 79% of those third-party-affected individuals “were affected by a breach from the technology sector.” Technology firms also accounted for 60% of all affected individuals in the caseload, including direct and supply-chain incidents.

    That is why I changed the sheet title. “Most third-party breach victims were hit through a tech vendor” is directionally right, but Kroll’s wording is “technology sector” or “technology firms,” and the precise claim is 79% of third-party-affected individuals in its June 2025–June 2026 cases. Kroll does not publish a product taxonomy that separates SaaS from on-prem software or MSPs. Denyl Green, Kroll’s global head of breach notification, describes the link as “a vendor, software supplier or service provider.”

    Organizations Breached Versus People Affected

    Count companies instead of people and the picture flips. Finance was the most breached industry by organization count, at 20% of Kroll-handled breaches in the period. Professional services also accounted for 20%. Technology ranked only seventh by number of organizations breached, about 6% of incidents in press coverage of the report, yet first by total individuals affected. Insurance ranked ninth by organizations breached and second by people affected.

    Kroll’s point is the domino effect. “One vendor compromise can generate breach notifications for dozens or hundreds of downstream organizations that never touched the vulnerable system directly.” Green puts it in operational terms: when a supplier is breached, every client still has to decide whose data was affected and whether customers and regulators need notice. The survey side of the report adds that 54% of IT and technology leaders named vendor and third-party breaches as their biggest compliance risk, versus 40% of C-suite executives and 30% of risk and compliance leaders, and that dependence on vendors was among the top four breach-response challenges, cited by 41% of respondents.

    My Recommendations: Rebuild Reviews Around Who Holds the Data

    Everything in this section is my opinion, not Kroll guidance and not legal advice. If blast radius tracks the firms that hold many customers’ data, the review should start there, not with the longest questionnaire.

    1. Inventory who actually holds or can reach personal data. List every SaaS product, file-transfer tool, MSP, backup provider, HR or CRM platform, and support vendor that stores, processes, or can export your customer or employee records. Include shadow IT someone bought with a card. If you cannot name the data classes each holds, you cannot tier them.
    2. Tier by blast radius, not by spend. A low-cost CRM that holds your full customer file outranks an expensive consultancy that only sees sanitized decks. Put high-blast vendors on continuous review: current SOC 2 Type II or ISO/IEC 27001 scoped to the service you use, MFA and logging requirements, and a named security contact.
    3. Rewrite notification and audit clauses for shared incidents. Require the vendor to tell you within a fixed number of hours, not “promptly,” and to share enough detail for your own regulator and customer notices. Add a right to receive evidence that your tenant was or was not in scope.
    4. Cut standing access. Prefer customer-controlled encryption keys where the product allows it, time-bound support access, and least-privilege API scopes. A vendor breach is less useful to an attacker if the vendor cannot reach everything by default.
    5. Run a joint tabletop on a supplier compromise. Decide in advance who owns regulator notice, customer notice, and insurer notice when the first alert comes from a vendor, not from your SOC.

    Picture this hypothetical. Your marketing team adopts a new email platform. Six months later that platform discloses a breach affecting multiple customers. If your inventory already shows it holds email addresses and purchase history, notification planning starts the same day. If the tool never made the vendor list, you spend the first week discovering you are in scope. That scenario is my illustration, not a Kroll case.

    The Bottom Line

    In Kroll’s June 2025–June 2026 cases, most people affected by a breach were affected through a third party, and most of those people were tied to technology-sector compromises. Finance still led in how many organizations were breached. The practical takeaway, in my view, is to rebuild vendor risk around who holds your data and how wide the blast radius is, not around who filled out the longest security questionnaire.

  • Exposed Attacker Servers Show Ransomware Affiliates Handing Parts of Intrusions to AI Agents: What Changes When the Hands on Keyboard Aren’t Only Hands

    Exposed Attacker Servers Show Ransomware Affiliates Handing Parts of Intrusions to AI Agents: What Changes When the Hands on Keyboard Aren’t Only Hands

    Your SOC playbook quietly assumes the attacker gets tired, makes typos, and logs off for the night. An affiliate that delegates the boring steps of a ransomware affiliates AI agents intrusions workflow does none of those things. So the gap between first alert and encryption is the number to re-measure. Two research teams recently got an unusual look at that workflow after attackers left their own servers open on the public Internet.

    Who Found the Exposed Servers

    In late September 2026, the SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU) found a publicly accessible command-and-control server at 45.227.254[.]43. Configuration files, logs, and credentials on that host led them to six more adversary servers, most on AS267784 (Flyservers S.A.). The Atos Threat Research Center (TRC), in a separate report by Piotr Mazurkiewicz, recovered material from an Internet-accessible host tied to the same INC ransomware ecosystem. Both teams describe affiliates of INC, also tracked as GOLD IONIC or MITRE G1032, with some cases branded as The Gentlemen. STRU rates confidence in a formal dual-brand alliance as low, and confidence that operators of both groups used a shared environment as moderate-to-high.

    What they found was not a malware dump. STRU recovered AI session databases, a central knowledge base, and the source of Phantom, which the operators called an “Autonomous Red Team Kill Chain Framework.” Atos TRC recovered a 1,882-record knowledge export, about 846 MB of tooling and victim data across 444 files, and HTTP logs showing successful downloads from the exposed service. STRU says the operators logged 8,257 messages across 133 OpenCode sessions and that one OpenRouter account showed about $23,920 in recorded spending. Those figures are vendor findings from the recovered logs, not independent measurements. STRU also graded 62 named organizations by depth of activity, 36 of them in the United States, and notes that many of the exploitation counts come from operator records that were not independently verified.

    What Was Handed to AI Agents, and What Was Not

    This is the distinction that matters for the headline. STRU assesses with high confidence an “AI-executed, human-approved operating structure.” A human operator started each campaign with a victim-specific master prompt and reviewed every step under the directive “coordinate every action with me.” The AI stack, OpenCode as the interface, commercial models hosted on OpenRouter (STRU names anthropic/claude-opus-4.6 and moonshotai/kimi-k3 among those used), Phantom’s skill library, and a persistent knowledge base, planned reconnaissance, selected techniques, generated commands, triaged stolen data, and drafted reports and extortion material. “WormGPT” was a persona prompt and a set of MCP servers, not a custom model. When a model refused a request, STRU says the operator rewrote it as an “Authorized Red Team Assessment Request” instead of switching models.

    Atos TRC is even more explicit. Its conclusion states that “the recovered evidence does not support the idea of autonomous AI conducting intrusions on its own.” AI “acted as a force multiplier for human operators,” reducing the effort to research targets, develop scripts, analyze data, document findings, and coordinate campaigns. Atos also notes that Phantom coordinated workflows, while individual actions could still run through custom Phantom agents, Mythic or Apollo C2, tunneling tools, or manually operated utilities. Recovered operator prompts Atos quotes are short and human-written, for example asking the assistant to continue from a session backup or to escalate from a domain user to Domain Admin given a service list. So the sheet headline “Handing Intrusions to AI Agents” overstates it. The accurate framing is that affiliates handed parts of the intrusion, planning, command generation, data triage, and drafting, to LLM-driven agents, while a human still chose targets and approved steps.

    Separately, both teams describe plenty of plain automation and conventional tooling that is not agent decision-making: FOFA-style scanning of edge devices, reverse-SOCKS tunnels (RevSocks, Chisel, Ligolo), scheduled-task persistence, BYOVD security-tool killers, restic or rclone exfiltration to cloud storage, and custom INC encryptor builds. STRU reports operator records claiming large-scale abuse of FortiClient EMS (CVE-2026-35616), SimpleHelp (CVE-2024-57727), and cPanel (CVE-2026-41940), and labels those counts as operator-reported. Treat the scanning and exploit claims as operator data, not confirmed victim totals. STRU also recovered 46 personalized INC encryptor builds staged for an October 1, 2026 wave and a September 30 SimpleHelp screenshot showing encryption on a workstation; deployment against the staged targets is unconfirmed.

    What Changes for Defenders

    The recommendations below are my opinion, not vendor guidance and not legal advice. If the planning and typing are machine-assisted, your response timelines need to assume a shorter dwell between foothold and impact.

    • Re-measure the first-alert-to-impact window. Build tabletop scenarios that assume continuous command generation overnight, not a human who sleeps. The SOCRadar and Atos material both show operators active on a schedule, but the agent does not get tired between approvals.
    • Prioritize edge and RMM hygiene. STRU’s hunting notes focus on rogue EMS admins, modified VPN on_connect scripts, unauthorized SimpleHelp or MeshCentral agents, and MSP credential reuse. Patch those surfaces and require MFA and IP allowlists on every remote-management path.
    • Alert on tooling the agents call. Watch for RevSocks, Chisel or Ligolo patterns, restic or rclone to unexpected cloud storage, Zemana-style vulnerable drivers paired with security-product termination, and mass .INC renames or INC-README.txt drops.
    • Treat data-extortion clocks separately. These operators preferred proof packs, pricing from stolen financials, and customer-facing notice pages. Have IR, legal, and notification templates ready before encryption starts.

    Picture this hypothetical. Your overnight SIEM shows a new EMS admin and a burst of PowerShell that looks like a junior analyst scripting. Under an agent-assisted playbook, that burst may be the middle of an approved kill-chain step, not a tired human. That scenario is my illustration, not a case from either report.

    The Bottom Line

    Exposed affiliate infrastructure shows LLM agents planning steps, generating commands, and drafting extortion text inside a human approval loop. It does not show fully autonomous ransomware. In my view, the practical change is shorter assumed dwell and louder hunting around the tools those agents call, not a rewrite of every detection rule overnight.

  • A Top Lawmaker Says Data Centers Will Be Critical Infrastructure: What That Designation Could Mean for Your Colo Contracts, Audits, and Incident Reporting

    A Top Lawmaker Says Data Centers Will Be Critical Infrastructure: What That Designation Could Mean for Your Colo Contracts, Audits, and Incident Reporting

    For about a decade, data centers have been treated like commercial real estate with good air conditioning. Now a senior lawmaker says that is going to change, and the phrase people are searching for is a data centers critical infrastructure designation. Before you rewrite your colo contracts, though, it is worth separating what was said, what has been proposed, and what is actually in force today. Those are three different things.

    What Was Actually Said, and by Whom

    The remark came from Rep. Jim Himes, D-Conn., the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, at a Brookings Institution event on Wednesday, October 21, 2026. According to Nextgov/FCW’s report, Himes said “I think there’s no question” that data centers will be considered critical infrastructure in the future. He added that “they’re going to be even more important than the network data centers that we’ve been living with for 40 years now because so much more functionality is going to rely on their health and existence.”

    Nextgov also reports that Himes said securing them will require a “robust compute infrastructure,” with services that “fragment and disperse” so that “critical functions are redundant and protected.” He predicted AI data centers “will start to look more like JP Morgan’s resilience centers than they look like today’s data centers.”

    That is one lawmaker’s prediction. It is not a designation, a bill he introduced, or an agency action. That is why I changed the headline from “Lawmakers Say Data Centers Will Be Treated as Critical Infrastructure” to “A Top Lawmaker Says Data Centers Will Be Critical Infrastructure.” Nextgov itself notes that although AI data centers “already underpin some of the critical infrastructure, they are not yet deemed to be a standalone sector.”

    Where Data Centers Sit Today

    CISA’s critical infrastructure sectors page lists 16 sectors. There is no Data Center sector. The closest fit is the Information Technology Sector. CISA describes it as producing and providing “hardware, software, and information technology systems and services, and—in collaboration with the Communications Sector—the Internet.” DHS is its Sector Risk Management Agency.

    One caution: neither CISA’s sector list nor its IT sector page uses the words “data center.” So it is fair to say that the functions running inside a data center fall within the IT sector, and its overlap with Communications, as CISA defines them. It is not accurate to say CISA has formally assigned data centers as a category to a specific sector. Nothing about current rules has changed because of the Himes remarks.

    Is Anything Formal in Motion?

    There is one bill worth knowing about. H.R. 8711, the Data Infrastructure Risk Reduction Act, was introduced on May 7, 2026, by Rep. Suhas Subramanyam, D-Va. It is a different lawmaker from Himes. If enacted, it would require DHS, acting through CISA, within 180 days to “identify data centers that should be treated as critical infrastructure,” to consider the security of the power and water infrastructure connected to them, and to submit to Congress a strategy to “defend data centers described in this subsection from external breaches from malefactors.” Congress.gov lists it as “Introduced,” and its latest action was a referral to the House Homeland Security subcommittee on May 8, 2026. It is a proposal, not law. Even if passed, it asks for an identification exercise and a strategy, not a new sector or new rules for operators.

    On incident reporting, the status is also proposed rather than in force. CISA’s CIRCIA page says the proposed rule was published April 4, 2024. It says “CISA continues to work on the final rule,” and that “multiple funding lapses impacted CISA’s ability to conduct rulemaking activity.” It also states plainly: “Until the effective date of the final rule, organizations are not required to submit covered cyber incident or ransom payment reports under CIRCIA.” The statute itself calls for reports within 72 hours of a covered incident and within 24 hours of a ransom payment once the final rule takes effect. Who counts as a covered entity is something the final rule will settle.

    My Recommendations for Your Colo Contracts

    Everything in this section is my opinion, not legal advice, and not a requirement that exists today. I think there is no reason to wait for a designation. Here is what I would review now.

    Incident-Reporting Clauses

    • Ask for a contractual notification window measured in hours, not “promptly.” If CIRCIA’s final rule eventually covers you, its 72-hour clock starts when you reasonably believe an incident occurred, and you cannot meet that if your provider tells you a week later.
    • Require the provider to share enough detail (timeline, affected systems, indicators) to support your own reports to regulators, insurers, and customers.

    Audit Rights and Evidence

    • Get the current SOC 2 Type II report and ISO/IEC 27001 certificate, and check that the scope actually includes the facility and services you use. A certificate scoped to headquarters does not help you.
    • Negotiate a right to audit or to receive bridge letters between report periods, plus a right to see the physical security and resilience testing summaries.

    Resilience and Dependencies

    • Ask how the facility handles utility power and water disruptions, the same dependencies H.R. 8711 calls out. Get the answer in writing.
    • Map which of your services sit in a single building. Himes’s “fragment and disperse” point applies to your own architecture as much as to the industry.

    Change-of-Law Language

    • Add a clause that commits both parties to renegotiate in good faith if new security or reporting obligations apply to the provider. That way a future designation is a conversation, not a dispute.

    Picture this hypothetical. A provider is later identified as critical infrastructure under a bill like H.R. 8711 and begins receiving federal security guidance. Customers with change-of-law and evidence clauses can simply ask for updated documentation. Customers without them have to wait for the next renewal. That scenario is my illustration, not something that has happened.

    The Bottom Line

    A top House Intelligence Democrat says there is “no question” data centers will be considered critical infrastructure. A bill that would have CISA identify which ones should be treated that way sits in committee. CIRCIA reporting is still waiting on a final rule. None of that changes your obligations today. In my view, it is still a good reason to make your colo contracts ready for the day it does.

  • DHS Ordered DeepSeek Out of Federal Civilian IT and Barred New Purchases: How to Build an AI Model Allowlist Before Your Own Regulator Asks for One

    DHS Ordered DeepSeek Out of Federal Civilian IT and Barred New Purchases: How to Build an AI Model Allowlist Before Your Own Regulator Asks for One

    Banning one app is the easy headline. The hard part, for agencies and companies alike, is answering “where is it actually running?” when models hide inside browser extensions, developer tools, and SaaS features nobody reviewed. That is why the DeepSeek federal ban is worth reading closely, and why it makes a good template for an AI model allowlist of your own. The order is narrower in some ways than the headlines, and broader in one way most people missed.

    What the Order Is, and Who Issued It

    It is not an executive order, an OMB memo, or a new law. It is Exclusion and Removal Order #2026-01, issued by the Secretary of Homeland Security under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018 (FASCSA). The order, published in the Federal Register on October 20, 2026 as DHS Docket No. DHS-2026-0628, is signed by Secretary Markwayne Mullin and copies OMB Director Russell Vought. The notice says the Secretary acted “following review of the Federal Acquisition Security Council Recommendation and affiliated evidence.”

    Dates matter here. The order’s “Original Release Date” is July 24, 2026. Federal Register publication came almost three months later. So the order was already in force well before most people heard about it.

    What It Removes, and From Where

    The order “Applies To: Federal Civilian Executive Branch Agencies except for their national security systems and secure compartmented information systems.” Under FASCSA, the Defense Department and the intelligence community issue their own orders, so this one does not cover them. That is why I retitled the post. “Federal civilian IT” is accurate. “Federal systems,” with no qualifier, is not.

    Within that scope, the “Required Actions” section tells all civilian agencies to:

    1. Exclude “DeepSeek, DeepSeek-affiliated entities, and their products from civilian agency procurements, effective immediately after issuance of this Order,” including “agency-approved products lists, service provider equipment lists, e-commerce markets.”
    2. Remove “products provided by DeepSeek, DeepSeek-affiliated entities, and third-party products and services developed using DeepSeek implementations, from civilian agency information technology systems immediately after the issuance of the Order, or seek an Exception.”

    Two details stand out. First, the phrase “third-party products and services developed using DeepSeek implementations.” This goes beyond DeepSeek’s own app or hosted API. As the law firm Haynes and Boone notes in its analysis, the order “does not define ‘DeepSeek implementation,’” and its removal text “neither distinguishes DeepSeek-hosted from self-hosted deployments nor addresses fine-tuned versions.” In other words, it is unclear whether a vendor’s product that runs a downloaded DeepSeek open-weight model is covered. The text reads broadly enough that a cautious agency would assume it is.

    Second, the stated risks. The order’s risk summary says DeepSeek’s servers are in China and that its account process “collects personally identifiable information and may also track and digitally fingerprint users.” It says prompts may result in “the transfer of sensitive data to the PRC,” and that “the models themselves may contain malware or other security vulnerabilities.” It cites research that found “multiple critical vulnerabilities” in DeepSeek’s iOS app.

    Exceptions, and a Window That Already Closed

    Agencies can ask for an exception, including asking that the order not apply to them, to certain actions, or for a delay. Requests “must be submitted in writing within 60 days of the issuance of this order,” with a “compelling justification” and “any alternative mitigations.” The order names no automatic carve-out for research. Its only categorical carve-out is national security and compartmented systems. Haynes and Boone calculates that, counted from July 24, the 60-day window “closed on Sept. 22, 28 days before publication.” It also notes the order is inconsistent about who reviews requests: one passage says CISA, another says DHS.

    Contractors are reached indirectly. Haynes and Boone explains that the FAR clause 52.204-30 carries FASCSA orders into contracts, requires contractors to check SAM.gov for such orders, and requires a report to the contracting officer within three business days of finding a covered article. That is Haynes and Boone’s reading of the clause, not text from the order itself.

    My Recommendations: Build an AI Model Allowlist

    This section is my opinion and my own playbook, not federal guidance. The order’s structure, exclude from purchasing, remove from systems, document exceptions, is a decent model for any organization.

    1. Inventory first. List every AI app, browser extension, IDE plugin, SaaS “AI feature,” hosted API, and locally run model. Ask vendors in writing which underlying models their features call. Contract language, not marketing pages, is where you will get a real answer.
    2. Write approval criteria. For each model, record who developed it, where it is hosted, where data goes, what the data-retention terms are, and which data classes it may touch. Approve a model per use case, not in general.
    3. Track open-weight provenance. For downloaded models, record the source repository, the exact model ID and hash, and any fine-tunes built on it. The DeepSeek order shows why: “developed using” can reach derivatives, and you will want to answer that question quickly.
    4. Enforce at the network and SaaS layers. Block unapproved AI domains at the secure web gateway or DNS layer, use your CASB or SaaS management tool to disable unapproved AI features, and route sanctioned API traffic through a gateway that logs which model was called.
    5. Control endpoints and developer tools. Use browser and extension allowlists, and watch for local model runtimes and large model-weight downloads on managed devices.
    6. Run an exceptions process with an expiry date. Require a written justification, compensating controls, an owner, and a review date, just as the order asks agencies to do.

    Picture this hypothetical. Your help-desk SaaS ships a new “smart summary” feature, and three months later you learn it runs a fine-tuned open-weight model nobody on your team reviewed. If your allowlist records models per vendor feature, that is a ticket. If it only lists apps, it is a surprise. That is my illustration, not a reported case.

    The Bottom Line

    DHS did not ban DeepSeek from all of government. It ordered federal civilian agencies, outside national security systems, to stop buying it and to remove it, including third-party products built with it, as of July 24, 2026. The open question of what counts as a “DeepSeek implementation” is exactly the question your own allowlist should be able to answer about every model you run.

  • A Forgotten Test Account With the Password ‘Password1’ Exposed Data on 3,300 People, Mostly Children: How to Find the Dormant Accounts Hiding in Your Own Directory

    A Forgotten Test Account With the Password ‘Password1’ Exposed Data on 3,300 People, Mostly Children: How to Find the Dormant Accounts Hiding in Your Own Directory

    Everyone budgets for zero-days. The breach that UK data regulators just turned into a cautionary tale needed no exploit at all. It needed a test account created in January 2012, a password of “Password1,” and two organizations that each thought the other had a handle on directory hygiene. If you want a real-world case study in dormant test account password security, the UK Information Commission’s Office (ICO) just published two of them from the same incident.

    What the ICO Found on Dormant Test Account Password Security

    On October 20, 2026, the ICO announced reprimands to two Welsh organizations following a November 1, 2024 ransomware attack: Ogi Networks Limited (ONL), a managed IT service provider, and the Local Government Data Unit – Wales, known as Data Cymru. The two formal reprimands, dated October 14, 2026, address the same breach from both sides of an outsourcing relationship. Data Cymru acted as a data processor for public-sector projects and retained overall control of its network, including the authority to instruct ONL to create or remove accounts. ONL acted as Data Cymru’s IT service provider and sub-processor since 2012.

    Here is what the primary sources say on the headline claims:

    • The password really was “Password1” on a 2012 test account. According to the ONL reprimand, ONL created an account named “Test2” on January 13, 2012, inside Data Cymru’s Active Directory to test user access before migrating real users. “Test2” was given the password “Password1.” It stayed in Data Cymru’s directory for more than 12.5 years, and had either remained active since 2012 or been inadvertently reactivated before the attack. Checked against Bitwarden’s password-strength tool, the ICO notes, “Password1” is rated “very weak” and can be compromised in less than a second.
    • The victim count is 3,300 people, mostly children. The sheet headline said “thousands of children’s records.” The ICO’s finding is narrower: “During the attack the personal information of 3,300 people was taken, the majority of whom were children,” tied to “two projects supporting children and families.” Because the ICO counts people rather than records and does not give the exact split between children and adults, I retitled the post to match its wording.
    • No ransomware crew is named. Neither the ICO news release nor the two reprimands—nor The Register’s coverage—name a ransomware group or strain. They refer only to “a ransomware attack” and “the threat actor.”

    How a Basic Test Account Became a Full Domain Compromise

    The technical chain in the ONL and Data Cymru reprimands is the part every identity administrator should read twice, because every step is a trap that exists in real production networks.

    First, an incident response firm hired by ONL found suspicious activity on “Test2” as early as September 20, 2024, and on a second test account, “testtest” (created May 8, 2015), on September 24, 2024. Initial access came through a FortiClient SSL VPN connection using “Test2,” likely via password spraying. Neither test account had administrative privileges. They were basic domain user accounts, which was enough to authenticate to an SSL VPN that lacked multi-factor authentication.

    Second, why did a 2012 password survive until 2024? Data Cymru actually had a Group Policy Object (GPO) requiring passwords of at least 15 characters. But as the Data Cymru reprimand notes, “Test2” predated that GPO. Because nobody logged into the dormant account, its password was never changed, so Windows never evaluated it against the newer 15-character policy. Raising minimum password length in Group Policy does not touch existing password hashes in the directory.

    Third, why did account reviews miss it? Data Cymru’s reviews were not scheduled or routine—and when it asked for a user list, it only requested members of the “Domain Users” Active Directory group rather than the full contents of Active Directory. After the ransomware hit, a full audit in November 2024 took just over four hours and found eight deprecated accounts, including “Test2,” “testtest,” and a consultant account with administrative credentials.

    Fourth, once inside, the attacker moved laterally because the local administrator accounts on three affected systems—a primary domain controller, a file server, and an internal SQL server—all shared the same password set in January 2012 and had never been reviewed since. Breaching one system let the attacker collect local account hashes and authenticate across the others. Before deploying ransomware on November 1, 2024, the attacker exfiltrated 42GB of data from those three servers and encrypted 182.7GB across the file and SQL servers.

    Finally, the governance gap was contractual too. Data Cymru lacked a UK GDPR Article 28(4)-compliant sub-processor contract with ONL until April 30, 2025, and had not documented how Active Directory would be monitored or audited. As ICO Head of Investigations David Doodson put it, “The responsibility for these failures did not sit with one organisation alone.”

    My Recommendations: How to Hunt Dormant Accounts in Your Own Directory

    This section is my opinion and my own operational checklist, not official ICO guidance.

    1. Export the whole directory, never a single group. Query every user object across Active Directory or Microsoft Entra ID, regardless of primary group membership, so accounts outside “Domain Users” cannot hide.
    2. Check PasswordLastSet, not just LastLogonDate. An account whose password predates your current length policy is still protected only by your old rule. Reset or disable every account whose PasswordLastSet is older than your current standard.
    3. Put an expiration gate on test and vendor accounts. Flag any account with “test,” “temp,” “vendor,” or “migration” in its name, or with a non-expiring password, and require project closeout checklists to verify removal.
    4. Enforce MFA on every remote access path. Move VPN authentication to SSO backed by Entra ID or your identity provider, enforce MFA via Conditional Access, and audit exclusion groups so test and service accounts cannot log in interactively from outside.
    5. Eliminate shared local admin passwords. Use Windows Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS) so every server and workstation gets a unique, rotated local admin password, and keep domain controllers isolated.
    6. Put directory audits in the MSP contract. Specify in writing who runs the quarterly full-directory export and who approves every remaining account.

    Picture this hypothetical. Imagine your team raises the domain password policy from eight characters to 16 after an audit. Five years later, an old staging account created for a printer migration—never logged into since—still has its eight-character password and still passes the LDAP filter on a legacy VPN. That is my hypothetical illustration of how policy changes leave legacy holes behind, not a reported customer incident.

    The Bottom Line

    The ICO notes that Data Cymru’s post-incident audit of Active Directory took just over four hours. Skipping that four-hour job for 12.5 years left a “Password1” test account on the perimeter and exposed data on 3,300 people, mostly children. Spend the four hours on your own directory this week.

  • CISA and FBI Say SafePay Ransomware Hit at Least 600 Victims and Wiped Some of Their Backups: Using Advisory AA26-293A to Test Your Own Recovery Before They Do

    CISA and FBI Say SafePay Ransomware Hit at Least 600 Victims and Wiped Some of Their Backups: Using Advisory AA26-293A to Test Your Own Recovery Before They Do

    Most ransomware tabletop exercises end with someone saying, “And then we restore from backup.” The joint SafePay ransomware CISA advisory AA26-293A is a good reason to test that sentence. The agencies say SafePay actors go after recovery before they encrypt anything, and that in some cases they deleted every network-attached backup a victim had. If your recovery plan assumes the backups will be there, this advisory is a free test script.

    What Advisory AA26-293A Says

    The advisory, #StopRansomware: SafePay Ransomware, carries the product ID AA26-293A and an original publication date of October 20, 2026. It is a joint advisory. The authoring agencies are the FBI, CISA, and the U.S. Secret Service, plus Germany’s Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz, the UK’s National Crime Agency, and the UK’s North West Regional Organised Crime Unit. It says its TTPs and indicators come from “FBI, USSS, and Landeskriminalamt Rheinland-Pfalz investigations as recently as August 2026.”

    On scale, the advisory says SafePay “was among the most active ransomware groups in 2026” and that its actors “have impacted at least 600 separate victims from multiple critical infrastructure sectors” since August 2024. CISA’s press release of October 21 rounds that to “approximately 600 victims,” and it quotes the FBI’s Brett Leatherman saying the actors “have already targeted more than 600 victims worldwide.” The advisory’s own wording is “at least 600” victims “impacted.” I am using that, not “organizations destroyed.”

    What It Says About Backups

    This is the part that matters most, and the advisory is more specific than “destroyed their backups.” It describes three distinct behaviors, all mapped to MITRE ATT&CK T1490, Inhibit System Recovery:

    • Shadow copies: SafePay actors “halt the Volume Shadow Copy Service.”
    • NAS backups: they “reset Network Attached Storage containing victim backup data to initial factory settings to inhibit system recovery attempts.”
    • Deletion, sometimes: the ATT&CK table adds that “In some cases, SafePay threat actors deleted all network-attached backups of company data.”

    The press release summarizes it as undermining recovery “by deleting or disabling backups.” So the accurate version is this. The advisory describes disabling shadow copies, factory-resetting backup NAS devices, and, in some cases, deleting all network-attached backups. It does not say every victim lost every backup, and it does not describe the backups themselves being encrypted. Encryption is reserved for files, which the advisory says are locked with a ChaCha20 and RSA hybrid scheme and “cannot be recovered without the decryption key.”

    How They Get There

    The advisory’s path to the backups is worth knowing, because each step is a place to catch them:

    • Initial access: credential exposure, brute-force password attacks, phished accounts, and VPN access, including through Mullvad VPN IP addresses. They exploit five listed CVEs in edge devices and internet-exposed systems: CVE-2020-3259, CVE-2023-20269, CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711, and CVE-2024-40766. Some of these they exploit “through automated scripts.”
    • Persistence and evasion: they take admin rights on existing or new accounts, disable security software, and in some cases change user passwords so valid logins stop working.
    • Lateral movement: PsExec, WinRM, RDP, and remote management tools. They find shares with ShareFinder.ps1 and SharpShares.exe.
    • Exfiltration before encryption: 7-Zip, WinRAR, and FileZilla to collect, WinSCP and RClone to send, and sometimes OneDrive. Victims who don’t pay face leak-site posting and, the advisory says, phone calls from the group.

    My Recommendations: Test Your Recovery Against This Advisory

    This section is my own recommendation. It is built on the advisory’s TTPs and mitigations, but the test plan is mine, not CISA’s.

    1. Ask whether your admin account can wipe your backups. The advisory’s mitigations call for backups that are “encrypted, immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted).” Log in as a domain admin and see whether you can delete a backup set or factory-reset the backup NAS. If you can, so can someone who steals that account.
    2. Check that an offline copy really exists. The advisory says to “Maintain offline backups of data and regularly test and maintain backup and restoration processes.” Find the copy that a NAS factory reset can’t reach. Then prove it is current.
    3. Run a restore without shadow copies. Assume Volume Shadow Copy is gone and restore a real server from your other backups. Time it. That number is your actual recovery time, not the one in the policy document.
    4. Patch the five CVEs, then check whether you were already hit. CISA’s press release urges “urgently patching the known exploited vulnerabilities in this advisory and conducting forensic triage to determine if systems have been compromised.” If any of these products face the internet in your environment, patching alone is not enough.
    5. Separate backup credentials from the domain. The advisory recommends least privilege and just-in-time admin access. I would go further and keep the backup system’s admin accounts out of Active Directory entirely.
    6. Alert on the precursors. Stopping the shadow copy service, mass admin password changes, new admin accounts, and RClone or WinSCP traffic to unfamiliar destinations should all page someone. The advisory’s mitigations include reviewing systems for “new, unactive and/or unrecognized accounts.”
    7. Practice the locked-out scenario. If attackers change your admins’ passwords, how do you get back in? Write the break-glass procedure and test it.

    Here is a hypothetical. Your backup appliance sits on the same domain as everything else, and its admin is a domain group. An attacker who reaches domain admin resets the appliance to factory settings at 2 a.m. and starts encryption at 3. Your restore plan now depends on whatever tape or cloud copy exists outside that domain. That is my illustration of the advisory’s described TTPs, not a reported case.

    The Bottom Line

    The advisory is specific: at least 600 victims, recovery targeted before encryption, shadow copies disabled, backup NAS devices reset, and in some cases all network-attached backups deleted. Read it as a test plan. Run the steps above against your own environment before someone else runs them for you.

  • PHP2Shell: Two Critical PHP RCE Flaws, Made Exploitable With AI Help, Hit the Engine Under Much of the Web: How to Find Every PHP Runtime You Actually Run

    PHP2Shell: Two Critical PHP RCE Flaws, Made Exploitable With AI Help, Hit the Engine Under Much of the Web: How to Find Every PHP Runtime You Actually Run

    On October 21, 2026, the PHP project shipped emergency releases for two critical flaws now widely called PHP2Shell. If you were looking for the PHP2Shell vulnerability patch, it is simple to state: PHP 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36, or 8.2.35. The hard part is knowing every place you actually run PHP. This PHP RCE story is less about one server and more about the dozen you forgot.

    What PHP Actually Shipped

    The php.net security advisory says those four releases “fix two critical vulnerabilities that can allow unauthenticated remote code execution,” and that “All PHP users are strongly encouraged to update immediately.” The two bugs are:

    • CVE-2026-109618, RCE via OOM corruption. In php.net’s words, out-of-memory handling “can interrupt PHP while internal request data is only partially initialized. Request cleanup may then treat the invalid data as valid.”
    • CVE-2026-109619, RCE via stale global state. Request-owned internal state “can survive after its backing memory has been freed. A later request handled by the same worker may use that stale state before normal initialization resets it.”

    On scope, php.net says this affects “all PHP installations serving web requests, including PHP-FPM, Apache with mod_php, php-cgi, FrankenPHP and LiteSpeed.” It considers the risk “highest for mod_php, with a demonstrated exploit where an unauthenticated request can trigger the attack before any application code runs.” The PHP Foundation’s post adds that remote code execution “was also confirmed on PHP-FPM through application-level code paths.” The PHP security team rates both at CVSS 9.2. The Foundation notes that the CVE IDs leaked a day early with “a wrong CVSS score of 10.0.”

    On older versions, php.net says branches 8.1 and earlier “no longer receive updates from the PHP project.” The security team published “minimal source-backports” for people who build from source. Tenable’s FAQ says those backports cover PHP 7.4 through 8.1. It also cites Calif’s writeup as finding affected code going back to PHP 5.4.0, which gets no fix from the project.

    Was AI Really Involved?

    Yes, by the researchers’ own accounts, though not alone. The PHP Foundation describes a longer history. A Foundation-contracted core developer “found the first signs of the OOM problem” during a 2024 audit, but “no concrete vectors were found.” Then on August 11, 2026, “researcher Ryan A at Calif reported an unconditional remote code execution with the same root cause.” The Foundation credits Calif, Wiz, OpenAI Codex Security, OSTIF, and Quarkslab for research and disclosure.

    Wiz’s research post, which is vendor research, says: “We used Wiz Atlas, Gemini 4 Argon and GPT-5.6 Sol throughout this research.” It says frontier models enabled them “to develop and adapt working exploits across multiple applications in hours.” Tenable says, “Calif and Wiz have both said they used AI models in their research.” So “found by AI” is shorthand. The underlying problem was spotted by a human in 2024, and AI models helped researchers prove it was exploitable this year.

    What About “Most of the Web” and “15 Minutes”?

    Wiz says PHP “powers 70% of all websites in the world.” Tenable cites a W3Techs figure that PHP is used by “69.3% of websites whose server-side language is known.” That measures how common PHP is, not how many sites are exploitable. Vulnerable versions, server mode, and protections all vary. So “much of the web runs PHP” holds up. “Most of the web is exposed” goes beyond what the sources measured.

    The “15-minute clock” in the original headline traces to a pre-release prediction that mass attacks would start within 15 minutes of the fix. None of the primary sources I read gives that as a measured fact, so I dropped it. What the sources do say about exploitation varies by date and by who is reporting. Tenable quotes Cloudflare’s CTO saying the company is “seeing early attacks emerging,” and says watchTowr reports “exploitation attempts against both.” Those are vendor observations, not counts of breached sites, and I would not assume you have more time than they suggest.

    Find Every PHP Runtime You Actually Run

    This section is my own recommendation as an operator, not guidance from PHP or any vendor. PHP often ships inside other software, so the hard part is finding it. Here is how I would do it.

    1. Distro packages. On each host, check the package manager, not just php -v. A box can have several PHP versions installed side by side. Php.net says distributions and LTS vendors got the patch early, so compare against your vendor’s advisory, since backported fixes may keep an older version number.
    2. CLI vs. FPM vs. mod_php. The CLI binary on your PATH may not be what serves web traffic. Check the FPM service and the Apache module separately. Then restart them. A patched package doesn’t help a worker that is still running the old code.
    3. Containers. Search image registries and running containers for PHP base images and bundled runtimes. Rebuild from patched bases and redeploy. Pulling a new tag does nothing to running pods.
    4. Managed hosts and platforms. For shared hosting, managed WordPress, or PaaS, ask the provider in writing which version you are on and when they patched.
    5. Appliances and bundled apps. Admin panels, monitoring tools, and vendor appliances often embed PHP. These are the hardest to see and the easiest to forget.
    6. End-of-life branches. Anything on 8.1 or older needs an upgrade, a vendor backport, or a decision to take it offline. php.net says these branches get no project updates, only the minimal source backports.

    Here is a hypothetical. Your web fleet is patched by lunch. Then someone remembers the old reporting server in a closet, running a vendor’s dashboard on PHP 7.x behind a forgotten port forward. That is the box your inventory needs to find. It is my illustration, not a reported case.

    If you need time, php.net lists interim settings, such as memory_limit=-1 enforced at the pool level and session.upload_progress.enabled=0. It is blunt that they “reduce exposure to specific attack paths but do not make an installation safe.”

    The Bottom Line

    Two engine-level RCE flaws, confirmed by the PHP project, patched in four supported branches, with exploitation attempts reported by security vendors. AI helped make them exploitable. It did not invent them. Patch, restart, rebuild, and then go hunting for the PHP you didn’t know you had.