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Moody’s Data Shows Exploited Vulnerabilities Stay Exposed for About Three Months: Closing the Gap Between Your Patch SLA and How Fast Attackers Move

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When a credit ratings firm starts measuring how long you leave the door open, patch speed stops being just an IT dashboard number. It becomes something your CFO, your insurer, and your board can read. Moody’s Ratings has now done exactly that. Its data on the time to patch exploited vulnerabilities puts the typical figure at about three months. Read the method closely, though, because the number is a little different from what the headlines suggest, and the difference matters if you plan to compare it with your own SLA.

What Moody’s Said, and When

On October 19, 2026, Moody’s published research arguing that AI-driven cyberattacks are a growing credit risk for companies with weak cyber defenses. I could not read that full report, which is behind Moody’s research paywall. Moody’s own press release, republished by BNamericas as an automatic translation of the São Paulo version dated October 20, says: “The median time to fix a critical vulnerability — or KEV — is about three months, while AI agents that have exceeded the intended scope of controlled test environments have exploited vulnerabilities and compromised systems in a matter of days.” Because that is a machine translation, I treat the exact wording as approximate. The figure itself matches the other sources.

Infosecurity Magazine’s coverage of the October 19 report gives the specific numbers: known exploited vulnerabilities “take a median time of 87 days to be patched,” compared with 107 days for vulnerabilities with no known exploitation. It says the report “uses February 2026 data from Bitsight Technologies that accounted for vulnerabilities disclosed over previous two years.” It also quotes a caveat from Moody’s: “Meaningful advances in AI’s offensive cyber capabilities since then may have further reduced the average time to exploit; remediation times may also have changed.”

Where the Three-Month Number Comes From

The 87-day figure first appeared in an earlier Moody’s report, “Risks posed by unpatched software flaws vary by industry and region,” dated April 1, 2026. That copy is hosted by SecureWorld, not by Moody’s. The method is spelled out there, and it is worth reading slowly. This is ratings-agency data, built on data from Bitsight, which Moody’s calls “our affiliate.”

  • The exact claim: “It takes a typical issuer 107 days for half of non-KEVs to become no longer externally observable, according to our analysis. This compares with 87 days for KEVs and 59 days for ransomware-associated KEVs.”
  • What is measured: not patch deployment. Moody’s says that because the analysis relies on external scanning, “we measure the time from first detection until a vulnerability is no longer externally observable, rather than the precise internal remediation timelines.” A flaw counts as closed “if it is no longer observed for 15 days after its last observed date.”
  • The sample: “around 9,500 issuers,” over two years of data, covering “most rated corporates, financial institutions and a large subset of public infrastructure and public finance issuers.”
  • Coverage: as of February 2026, “Bitsight tracks roughly 35% of KEVs.” So the 87 days describes the KEVs Bitsight can see from the internet, not all of them.
  • The statistic: a median per issuer, meaning the time for half of an issuer’s vulnerabilities to stop being visible. It is not an average and not a worst case.

That is why I softened the headline. “Typically take three months to patch” is a fair shorthand, and Moody’s own release says “time to fix.” But the underlying measurement is how long a flaw stays visible from outside. A system can stop showing a vulnerability because it was patched, put behind a firewall, or decommissioned. Patching is not the only way out of the data.

Why the Gap Matters

Moody’s April report sets the 87 days against two benchmarks. First, “CISA recommends remediation within 21 days for most KEVs.” Second, it cites Flashpoint data that the average time from public disclosure to first exploitation “fell to 44 days in 2025 from 115 in 2024.” It calls that comparison “very conservative,” because Bitsight may take “days or even weeks” to detect a new vulnerability, which “likely understates the true speed advantage of attackers.” It also found that “close to 40% of issuers in any given month had an unpatched KEV that was older than 45 days.”

The credit angle is in the October press release: “Organizations with poor patching practices will likely fall even further behind,” and organizations with low cyber resilience “will be exposed to higher credit risk.” That is Moody’s forecast, not a finding, but it is a forecast from the people who rate your debt.

My Recommendations for Closing the Gap

This section is my opinion, not Moody’s guidance.

  1. Measure your time to patch exploited vulnerabilities the way an outsider would. Your internal ticket says “closed.” An external scan says “still there.” Track both, and look hard at any gap between them.
  2. Make the SLA risk-based, with KEV as its own tier. Generic “critical in 30 days” SLAs treat a CVSS score as the risk. I would put anything in CISA’s KEV catalog on a clock that starts at its listing date, with CISA’s 21 days as the ceiling for internet-facing systems, and treat ransomware-associated KEVs as the fastest lane.
  3. Report medians and tails together. A median of 87 days means half took longer. Moody’s found more than a quarter of issuers had at least one KEV visible for over a year. Your board should see your slowest decile, not just your average.
  4. Count mitigation honestly. Taking a service off the internet is a legitimate fix. Write it down as a mitigation with a review date, so it doesn’t turn into a permanent exception.
  5. Shrink the internet-facing footprint. Moody’s found that 78% of issuers in the top tenth by critical internet-facing systems had old unpatched KEVs, compared with 7.2% in the bottom tenth. Fewer exposed assets means fewer things to chase.

Here is a hypothetical to make it concrete. Your monthly report shows 95% of critical patches applied within SLA. An outside scan still sees last spring’s VPN flaw on a forgotten secondary appliance. Your dashboard is green while the ratings data could show you as exposed. It is my illustration, not a case from Moody’s.

The Bottom Line

Moody’s ratings-agency data says the typical organization takes about 87 days for half of its known exploited vulnerabilities to stop being externally visible, while attackers, by Flashpoint’s count, averaged 44 days to first exploitation in 2025. The number is narrower than “time to patch,” but the gap it shows is real. And now it is measured by someone who isn’t you.

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