Steve Miller's Blog

A digital workshop for systems-minded tech commentary.

Ransomware Victims Report Threats Against Employees’ Families in a New Survey: Your Incident Response Plan Needs a Personal Safety Chapter

Three colleagues in a quiet conference room discuss employee safety planning around a table

Written by

in

Search for “ransomware physical threats employees families” this week and you will find a burst of coverage built mostly on one source: Semperis’s 2026 Ransomware Risk Report. The numbers are alarming. They are also self-reported survey figures from a security vendor, and the reporters who looked at them said they could not independently confirm them. I think the topic deserves a place in your incident response planning anyway, and this post explains both halves of that.

Ransomware Physical Threats to Employees’ Families: What the Survey Found

First, who produced the data. Semperis, which sells identity recovery and crisis response services, says in its report that it partnered with research firm Censuswide, which surveyed “1,200 IT and security professionals” in nine countries and several industry sectors in the first half of 2026. The report says it “surveyed only organizations that were successfully attacked.” That means the percentages describe organizations that were already ransomware victims, not companies in general.

Here are the figures as the report states them:

  • “Threatening texts, letters, or packages”: 57%.
  • “Threats against family or friends”: 37%.
  • “Physical intrusion”: 19%. “Abduction”: 17%. “Bodily harm”: 13%. “Stalking”: 6%.
  • On the effects: “doxxing,” 25%, and “swatting,” 23%. Swatting is defined in the report as “harassed by fabricated emergency reports that resulted in law enforcement being dispatched to their location.”
  • “More than half (53%) of respondents reporting that ransomware attackers carried through on threats in the past year.”

The report also says “41% of respondents said they had been the target of physical or psychological intimidation.” Semperis’s October 14 press release gives slightly different versions: “40% of attacks involved psychological or physical threats against staff” and “24% of victims or family members were swatted.” The report’s body says 23% for swatting. I cannot tell which is a typo or a rounding choice, so treat these as roughly 40% and roughly a quarter. The press release also says “nearly 25%” faced psychological intimidation, while the report’s list of attacker threats shows psychological intimidation at 23% and physical threats at 17%. The denominators are not always clear. For example, the 57% figure appears to be a share of people who were threatened at all, as Dark Reading describes it, not a share of all respondents.

CSO Online’s coverage repeats the survey figures, including that “37% said employees’ friends or family members had been threatened,” and notes the survey’s sample and scope. It does not add independent evidence of its own.

What the Data Cannot Tell Us

Dark Reading is the most cautious source, and its caution matters. It writes that Semperis’s study “relied on self-reporting, and it couldn’t corroborate these alarming figures, nor could Dark Reading.” It adds that “Dark Reading failed to find even a single documented case of violence perpetrated in service of a ransomware attack.” When it asked Semperis for a case study, Semperis pointed to a Europol release on so-called violence-as-a-service, which “did not connect violence-as-a-service with ransomware.” A Semperis incident response director told Dark Reading that physical harm “does happen” in “some way, shape, or form.”

Dark Reading also notes year-over-year confusion: it says 40% of participants in Semperis’s 2025 report reported physical threats, while only 17% of 2026 respondents said they had been subject to physical threats. It also reports related trends in other crimes, such as violent “wrench attacks” in cryptocurrency theft, and says that “What’s true of cryptocurrency is not necessarily true of enterprise cyberattacks.” I am not citing those numbers here beyond noting that Dark Reading frames them as adjacent, not proof.

So the responsible reading is this. One vendor survey says a large share of attacked organizations report personal threats, including against families. Independent verification of violence is missing, and prevalence in the wider population of companies is unknown. I would not tell your executives that gangs are now routinely stalking employees’ families. I would tell them that credible-enough reports of family-directed threats exist, and that a plan for them costs little.

What the Report and Coverage Recommend

Semperis’s report advises documenting “roles not just within the cybersecurity team, but across the entire enterprise,” establishing out-of-band communications, and including “procedures for how to respond to incidents that involve places and people outside the organization, such as threats against family members,” including reaching out to local and federal law enforcement in advance. CSO Online’s article says that employees should have “a confidential channel to report intimidation” and that HR, legal, cybersecurity and corporate security teams should know when to escalate to law enforcement. It also quotes the CEO of the consultancy Primus Partners saying the organization should “minimize information retention and access to sensitive personal information of employees.” Those recommendations come from vendor, media and consultant voices, not from regulators.

My Recommendation: A Personal Safety Chapter

This section is my opinion. The checklist is my own, built on the sources above, and no source requires it.

Picture this hypothetical. During an incident, a member of your on-call team tells their manager that someone has contacted a relative. If the runbook has nothing to say, the manager improvises, and the employee may feel alone with the problem. A short chapter prevents that.

  1. Name an owner. Pick one person from HR, legal or corporate security who handles personal-safety reports during incidents.
  2. Give staff a private reporting path. Make it clear how to report any contact or threat, with no penalty and no need to prove it first.
  3. Pre-build the law enforcement contacts. Know whom you would call locally and federally before you need them.
  4. Decide support up front. Agree in advance what help you can offer affected staff, such as counseling or security advice, and who can approve it.
  5. Reduce exposed employee data. Review what personal information about staff sits in company systems and public profiles, and cut what you do not need.
  6. Separate safety from the ransom decision. Document who decides how to respond to threats against people, and keep that apart from the technical recovery plan.
  7. Rehearse it. Add one personal-threat inject to your next tabletop.

The Bottom Line

The evidence is one vendor survey with self-reported answers and independent coverage that could not verify it. The planning cost is small, and the downside of having no plan is borne by people. That is why I would add the chapter, while being plain about what we do and do not know.

Comments

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *