Search for “residential proxy botnet D-Link Ubiquiti SAP” and you will land on a campaign that GreyNoise published on October 15, 2026. The actual story is narrower than the phrase suggests: one actor, a named set of known vulnerabilities, and at least 143 compromised devices, reported by one security vendor. The sources call it a proxyjacking campaign, not a botnet, and I will stick to their wording. For operators, the interesting part is how little noise it makes.
What GreyNoise Reported
GreyNoise, a threat intelligence company, says in its October 15 post that it identified a malicious cyber actor conducting a proxyjacking campaign against network edge devices globally, installing Pawns.app “on behalf of the attacker.” It defines proxyjacking as when an attacker “forces victim devices into proxy networks in order to monetize their bandwidth.” Pawns.app is a legitimate bandwidth-sharing application, which GreyNoise says is a “direct partner” of the proxy provider IPRoyal. The problem is that the attacker installed it without the device owners’ consent.
GreyNoise says the actor “successfully compromised at least 143 devices in 34 countries,” and lists the exploited vulnerabilities:
- D-Link ShareCenter NAS: CVE-2024-3272 and CVE-2024-3273.
- Ubiquiti UniFi Video NVR: CVE-2021-44228, which is the Log4Shell vulnerability.
- SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer: CVE-2025-31324.
GreyNoise adds that the actor “appeared to target other brands” of video recorders such as Hikvision and Dahua, without naming the flaws used. In some cases the actor also set up SSH key authentication as “a backup access method.” BleepingComputer’s coverage repeats those details and says GreyNoise found the campaign “while investigating suspicious activity at an unnamed organization.” In GreyNoise’s account, that investigation began when the organization saw residential-looking IP addresses in its sign-in logs, and found multiple users authenticating from the same residential address.
Does “SAP Boxes” Hold Up?
Not really, and the difference matters to operators. SAP NetWeaver Visual Composer is enterprise application server software, not a consumer or edge appliance. The U.S. National Vulnerability Database entry lists the affected product as “SAP NetWeaver (Visual Composer development server),” versions “VCFRAMEWORK 7.50,” and describes the flaw as allowing an unauthenticated attacker “to upload potentially malicious executable binaries.” That entry also shows the flaw is in CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, added April 29, 2025. Neither GreyNoise nor BleepingComputer says how many of the 143 devices were SAP systems, or which versions. So I will say “SAP systems,” not “SAP boxes,” and I will not suggest SAP environments were a large share of victims.
The D-Link entry is also specific. The NVD lists CVE-2024-3272 and CVE-2024-3273 as affecting D-Link “DNS-320L, DNS-325, DNS-327L and DNS-340L,” with the note that the issue “only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.” GreyNoise names the product family as ShareCenter NAS rather than listing models, so I am reporting the NVD’s model list as NVD’s, not as GreyNoise’s. Log4Shell is a 2021 flaw that GreyNoise says was used against UniFi Video NVRs, with no model or version given.
Is It Ongoing?
The sources do not say. GreyNoise calls it “a recent example” and published indicators, including an IP address it ties to exploitation and the payout account. Neither it nor BleepingComputer gives a start date, an end date, or a statement that the campaign has stopped. So I would treat it as recently observed, with current status unknown.
For context, the FBI’s March 2026 FLASH on AVrecon malware describes a separate case where routers and other IoT devices were sold as residential proxies through the SocksEscort service, which it says was taken down by law enforcement. It says residential proxies let threat actors “make their activity appear as if it originates from the victim’s network.” That is a different operation and I am not linking the two.
Why It Matters for Operators
GreyNoise explains that residential proxies “fundamentally break some of the core assumptions about the detectable characteristics of infrastructure used for malicious activity,” such as “Login from Impossible Travel Location” alerts. BleepingComputer notes that devices in proxy networks can lead to “IP address blocks” or allegations of involvement in illegal activity for the owners, and recalls an earlier FBI warning about such networks being used for credential stuffing.
My Recommendations for Operators
This section is my opinion. Where I draw on GreyNoise or the FBI’s FLASH, I say so.
- Inventory exposed older gear. Find NAS units, video recorders and appliances reachable from the internet. Anything on a vendor’s end-of-life list is the first candidate. The FBI’s FLASH says that for unsupported devices, “consider replacing the device with a model that is still receiving security updates.”
- Check for known-exploited flaws. Compare what you find against the CVEs above. For SAP, confirm whether Visual Composer is installed and exposed, rather than assuming.
- Look for unexpected outbound traffic from devices that should be quiet. A NAS or recorder should not be initiating proxy-style connections. Check for unfamiliar SSH keys, since GreyNoise says some victims had them added.
- Remember removal is not eviction. If the proxy client is gone but an attacker’s SSH key remains, access remains. I would rebuild or replace a device with confirmed compromise.
- Watch for residential IPs in sign-in logs. GreyNoise recommends detecting residential proxy addresses in authentication logs, and especially “multiple enterprise users” signing in from the same one. It also suggests looking at device and session identifiers, not only geolocation.
- Restrict egress. Limit what unmanaged or legacy devices can reach outbound, so a hijacked box has a harder time acting as an exit node.
Picture this hypothetical. An old recorder in a back office has been exposed for years. Nobody pages anyone because nothing is encrypted and no data is stolen. Meanwhile, someone else’s traffic leaves through your address. That is a plausible shape for this kind of abuse, but it is my illustration, not a case from the reports.
The Bottom Line
One vendor reported one actor and at least 143 devices, using vulnerabilities that were already public. What we do not know is how widespread this is, which SAP systems were involved, or whether it continues. What we do know is cheap to act on: find your forgotten devices, retire the unsupported ones, and add residential proxy detection to your sign-in monitoring.
