Most disaster recovery plans picture a fiber cut, a flood or a power failure. This month’s reporting on Yandex adds a scenario that many plans do not include: physical attack on a data center. I want to be careful here. This is a war, the facts come from companies and governments with a stake in the story, and I will attribute each claim to the source that made it. The reason I am writing about it is narrower: what the reports describe about data center physical attack disaster recovery is worth a look from anyone who runs, or buys, hosted infrastructure.
What Yandex and the Press Report
Yandex, the Russian technology company, described the first two incidents in an October 9 statement: “On the night of October 7th to 8th, the Yandex data center in Sasovo was seriously damaged in a drone attack. It has been completely shut down. This morning, another of our data centers, in Kaluga, was attacked. Part of its infrastructure is out of service.” It also said “No employees were hurt in either Sasovo or Kaluga” and that “it is very difficult to say when the equipment at the data centers will be back up and running.”
The statement does not say who launched the drones. The attribution comes from elsewhere. The BBC reports that Ukraine’s defence ministry “confirmed the data centre attacks,” saying they could “force Russia to divert resources to repair the damaged capacity,” and that President Volodymyr Zelensky said the attacks were in response to weeks of Russian strikes on Ukrainian data centers. Zelensky is quoted by The Record as telling reporters: “We always respond in kind. You all know that they have attacked and continue to attack our data centers. We responded.” Those are Ukrainian statements, reported by the BBC and The Record. I cannot independently verify them.
The BBC adds that “Moscow has justified the attacks by saying the data centres were used by Ukrainian military intelligence,” while Ukraine “accuses it of deliberately targeting civilian infrastructure.” That describes the Russian and Ukrainian positions on strikes against Ukrainian data centers. I am not taking a side on either claim.
The third incident came days later. The BBC reported that Yandex “confirmed on Telegram that its data centre in Vladimir had been damaged and that operations had been ‘completely suspended’,” with some services unavailable to users. The BBC published that on Sunday, October 11, calling it the third attack that week.
What Was Affected
The Record from Recorded Future News reports the disruption reached beyond Yandex’s own apps. It says the attacks “disrupted Yandex Cloud, which provides computing infrastructure to thousands of businesses, as well as some of the company’s own services and third-party platforms that depend on its servers.” Citing the Russian internet watchdog, it reports users “have experienced problems accessing email, booking taxis, ordering food and making payments through Yandex Pay.” It adds that “The full extent of the disruptions remains unclear” and that Yandex has not said how many customers were affected.
Two reporting details differ, so I will flag them. The BBC says two of Yandex’s five data centers were struck in its first report, while The Record says three of six had been targeted by Sunday. I cannot reconcile the totals from these sources, so I would not repeat either as a company-wide fraction. Also, The Record says the Sasovo site “reportedly” houses two of Yandex’s three AI-training supercomputers, and that Yandex has not disclosed whether any were damaged. The BBC likewise says it is “unclear whether the supercomputers survived.”
Some of the most relevant details for IT teams come from The Record. It reports that after the latest strike, “the company advised cloud customers to consider alternative recovery plans rather than relying solely on switching between parts of Yandex Cloud’s own infrastructure.” It says Russian state media reported agreements with competing providers Selectel, K2Cloud and VK Cloud to help customers move data and services. And it reports that Yandex updated its terms of service “to exclude liability for failing to meet contractual obligations because of drone strikes and other attacks,” which could limit customers’ ability to seek compensation. I did not independently confirm those terms.
Data Center Physical Attack Disaster Recovery: My Takeaways
This section is my opinion and recommendation. The sources do not say any of it, and I am not drawing conclusions about the war.
The reporting does not tell us how Yandex designed its sites, so I will not guess about its architecture. What I can say is what the advice to customers implies. If your recovery plan assumes you can fail over inside one provider’s infrastructure, a regional or multi-site event may test that assumption. Most of us will never face drones, but the same planning question applies to any event that takes several nearby facilities offline at once.
Here is what I would review:
- Ask where your workloads and backups physically are. “Two sites” can still be a single geography decision. Ask for locations by region, not just availability zone names.
- Test a failover that leaves your primary provider. If you only practice switching inside one cloud, you have not tested the case where that provider is degraded across several sites.
- Keep a restore path you control. Hold backups somewhere your provider’s incident cannot reach, and practice restoring from them.
- Read the liability and SLA terms. The Record’s report that a provider changed its terms to exclude attack-related failures is a reminder to know what you could claim.
- Map hidden dependencies. The Record notes that third-party services hosted on Yandex infrastructure were also affected. List which of your vendors run on the same provider as you.
- Set your own decision triggers. Decide in advance what level of provider degradation triggers a move to your alternate plan, and who can approve it.
Picture this hypothetical. Your main application runs in two zones of one provider’s region, and your backups sit in the same provider. A regional event degrades both zones. The plan says “fail over to zone B,” but zone B is part of the problem. That is the kind of gap a single-provider test will not reveal.
The Bottom Line
The facts that hold up across these sources are limited: three Yandex data centers were reported attacked by drones between October 7 and 11, two were reported shut down, services were disrupted, and Ukrainian officials have publicly described the strikes as retaliation. Everything beyond that is either unclear or opinion. For infrastructure teams, my takeaway is modest and practical: test the recovery path that does not depend on a single provider’s geography.
